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Abstract 
This paper follows the 9/11 paper presented at METU in the previous year. It attempts to 
analyse the fundamental features of the world economy giving rise to the present military 
phase.  It argues that globalisation is a self-limiting process. 
Fundamental long-term developments, arising out of the present organisation of the world 
economy, are acting systematically to undermine it. This results in a crisis I call structural. By this 
I mean that it is neither transitory nor accidental. It is a permanent, ineradicable and ultimately 
dominant determinant of the way the world is now evolving. 
This structural crisis, the paper argues, arises from an unsustainable economic relation between 
the US economy and the world economy. This expresses itself in a new form, evident in the 
events that have unfolded since 11th September 2001.  
The market is literally tearing the world apart; it is beginning to render large tracts of it 
ungovernable. As its economic mechanisms become increasingly incapable of resolving the 
social contradictions that they create, the nations and societies through which it is mediated 
are being plunged into increasingly in openly political conflict. The endemic crises, armed 
conflicts and governmental instability of the Middle East, of Central Asia, of the Balkans, of 
Central and Northern Africa, of Central and Southern America, and of South-East Asia, each has 
its specificity. But the basic driving force behind all of them is same: the crushing weight of two 
decades of accelerating economic stagnation, accompanied by universally growing inequality. 
The governments of the advanced nations, who have provoked and lived off this phase of 
world development, now face problems no longer solvable by purely economic means. 
Confronted with countries and regions in which economic conditions lay no sound basis for 
stable government external intervention, willing or not, becomes the only remaining option. 
Whereas the conflicts of the eighties and nineties centred on the financial and commercial 
organisations such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, and although these organisations 
continue to serve as an arena in which increasingly acrimonious and conflictual relations 
between nations and regions are fought out, open geopolitical intervention – war, the violent 
overturn of governments, the break-up of nations, annexation, and colonisation, and open 
trade conflict – is now at the top of the agenda. The state, in a word, is back. 
This is the fundamental reason behind an epochal shift in US policy towards direct military and 
political intervention in the internal affairs of states. Accompanying this is a growing political 
tension between the advanced countries and a growing inability of the US to impose a political 
consensus, most clearly demonstrated by the enormous problems it has had in building a 
coalition for its war on Iraq. This signals a phase of more or less open geopolitical struggle 
between advanced countries for territorial dominance, driven by the need to dominate and 
subordinate the labour of the rest of the world to their own capitals. 
 
This paper was presented at the 6th Annual Conference of the Middle East Technical University 
(erc/METU), Ankara, September 11-14, 2002. Panel Session ‘Deglobalisation: The Failure of the 
‘New Paradigm’  
 
Keywords: 9/11, World Economy, Kondratieff, Development, Europe, US, value, price, TSSI, 
temporalism, profit rate, polarisation, inequality, globalisation, deregulation, imperialism, 
World Systems Theory, unequal exchange, dependency, North-South 
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Absolute impoverishment 
Chart 1: People whose income has declined in the past decade 
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In 1991, the GDP of the world in dollars was $4,997. In 2000, it was $4,909.  
In 1980 118 million people lived in nine countries where GDP per head was declining.1 In 1998, 
there were 60 such countries and 1.3 billion such people.  
This is an altogether new social and political development. It reverses a twenty-five-year 
postwar trend in which, though the relative gap between the world’s rich and poor grew as has 
more or less since the industrial revolution, nevertheless nearly everyone was in some sense 
getting better off. The material well-being of the whole of humanity was advancing – 
unequally, not as well as could have been done by other means, assisted by the moderating 
impact of countries outside the world market, and under circumstances which minimised the 
latter’s extent and influence. Nevertheless, a case could be made that, in some general sense, 
nearly everyone was drawing some benefit from the world market, such as it was in those days. 
This fact of the past world is unquestioningly accepted; it underpins the most basic intellectual 
heritage of the epoch. The Western enlightenment ideal of progress itself, supposes that 
underneath spiritual or moral development there lies at least some substratum, however 
deeply buried, of rising material welfare. The very idea of ‘development’ that presupposes 
                                                             
1 Measured in constant 1995 dollars at current (period average) market exchange rates. All information in this chapter, unless 
otherwise notified, is extracted from GDP data published by the IMF in its World Economic Outlook database, data before 1992 on 
the countries in transition from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, and population data from the US Bureau of the 
Census. 
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there is something to develop into. 
Chart 2: World GDP 
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This has now stopped. Measured in the world market’s currency, the wealth-producing capacity 
of the world is no longer keeping up with its population growth, and the wealth-producing 
capacity of nearly a quarter of its people is literally marching backwards. 
Stagnation and divergence: shaping a new political geography 
The world geographical and political order arising on the basis of this new economic reality 
dates from the wave of market liberalisation that opened in the early 1980s. It is the outcome of 
two trends that have each existed in varying degrees in the past, but have now both 
accelerated and combined. 
Firstly, the absolute growth rate of the world economy has been falling systematically as chart 
2 has already shown. Table 1 summarises the outcome.  
Table 1: world GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars 
 World GDP World GDP per capita 
70-80 5.51% 3.76% 
80-90 2.27% 0.69% 
90-00 1.09% -0.19% 
Secondly, the world is diverging. From 1984 the industrialised and ‘other advanced’ countries, 
comprising both newly-industrialising countries like South Korea and Taiwan, and minor 
European countries like Norway and Spain, pulled away from the rest of the world – 
comprising, it is worth reminding ourselves, 5 billion people. In the 90s per capita GDP in the 
countries in transition fell between 50% and 75% depending on the measure adopted, 
catapulting them into the ranks of the developing countries. And in a further development, 
during the nineties the Major Industrial Countries (the G7) pulled away from the other 
advanced economies. 
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Chart 3: Divergence, big time: GDP per capita since 1970 
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As chart 3 shows, this differential growth did not speed up the growth of the advanced 
countries relative to the rest of the world. It slowed down the growth of the rest of the world, 
relative to the advanced countries. 
Chart 3: stagnation plus divergence 
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In a nutshell, the rich countries no longer grow from the lion’s share of the wealth they allowed 
the world to create; they grow from the vulture’s share of the wealth they take from it. 
These underlying economic trends are unsustainable. The rate of growth of the world economy 
is steadily decreasing, and the wealth it produces is ever more unequally distributed. The rich 
countries – notably but not exclusively the USA – have ceased to serve as a motor of world 
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growth. To the extent that they still grow, they do so at the expense of the rest of the world, 
and in competition with each other. The disputes between the rich countries are therefore, de 
facto, no longer disputes over how the world is run, but over who runs it. 
1 Institutionalised war 
Fundamental long-term developments, arising out of the present organisation of the world 
economy, are thus acting systematically to undermine it. This results in a crisis I call structural. 
By this I mean that it is neither transitory nor accidental. It is a permanent, ineradicable and 
ultimately dominant determinant of the way the world is now evolving. 
In the rest of this chapter I assess the nature, extent, and dynamic of this structural crisis which, 
I will argue, arise from an unsustainable economic relation between the US economy and the 
world economy. This expresses itself in a new form, dramatically evident in the events that 
have unfolded since 11th September 2001.  
The market is literally tearing the world apart; it is beginning to render large tracts of it 
ungovernable. As its economic mechanisms become increasingly incapable of resolving the 
social contradictions that they create, the nations and societies through which it is mediated 
are being plunged into increasingly in openly political conflict. The endemic crises, armed 
conflicts and governmental instability of the Middle East, of Central Asia, of the Balkans, of 
Central and Northern Africa, of Central and Southern America, and of South-East Asia, each has 
its specificity. But the basic driving force behind all of them is same: the crushing weight of two 
decades of accelerating economic stagnation, accompanied by universally growing inequality. 
The governments of the advanced nations, who have provoked and lived off this phase of 
world development, now face problems no longer solvable by purely economic means. 
Confronted with countries and regions in which economic conditions lay no sound basis for 
stable government external intervention, willing or not, becomes the only remaining option. 
Whereas the conflicts of the eighties and nineties centred on the financial and commercial 
organisations such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, and although these organisations 
continue to serve as an arena in which increasingly acrimonious and conflictual relations 
between nations and regions are fought out, open geopolitical intervention – war, the violent 
overturn of governments, the break-up of nations, annexation, and colonisation, and open 
trade conflict – is now at the top of the agenda. The state, in a word, is back. 
This is the fundamental reason behind an epochal shift in US policy towards direct military and 
political intervention in the internal affairs of states. Accompanying this is a growing political 
tension between the advanced countries and a growing inability of the US to impose a political 
consensus, most clearly demonstrated by the enormous problems it has had in building a 
coalition for its war on Iraq. This signals a phase of more or less open geopolitical struggle 
between advanced countries for territorial dominance, driven by the need to dominate and 
subordinate the labour of the rest of the world to their own capitals. 
Is there a precedent? 
The process bears all the hallmarks of a new stage of world history, which obviously has its own 
unique and distinctive features. Nevertheless, whilst unprecedented in this century, it has 
happened before. Economic history has seen long periods of decline before, and at least one of 
them was also accompanied by a prolonged process of divergence. The ‘Great Depression’ 
which opened in the 1870s, and which went on for thirty years, was followed by a period in 
which the bulk of the globe was re-organised by the great powers driven by a prolonged 
inability to reconstruct profit and growth rates within the world market as it then existed.  
They reacted at that time by extending a still underdeveloped world market in capital into the 
whole of the world, under their dominion, and in the process opened a phase of military 
conflict both between themselves and the countries which fell under their sway, and between 
each other – over whose sway these countries would fall. Today’s advanced powers are bent 
not so much on a first time opening as a re-opening of such a world market, breaking up the old 
USSR, placing China in their sights, and reshaping the map of the world to facilitate the free 
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movement of capital. 
Nevertheless, as commentators such as Hurst and Cutler (0000) have noted, the world market 
now probably bears more resemblance to that of the 1890s than to that of any previous period 
in the last century. 
It is this period, I will argue, that provides the best and richest historical analogies, all 
proportions guarded, for understanding the present. I believe, therefore, we are more likely to 
understand what is happening in the world of today by realising that it is a renewed and 
reconstituted form of classical imperialism, than by treating it as the outcome of an ahistorical, 
unlimited, and universal process of globalisation. 
Is there an end in sight? 
Endless decline is not inevitable.The long depression of the 1870s gave way to a period of 
unstable rapid growth – the ‘Belle Époque’ or Third Kondratieff, which combined three main 
characteristics: heady but unstable growth for a small group of advanced countries, precipitate 
impoverishment and barbarisation of the rest of the world, and headlong descent into war.  
As I will discuss later in this chapter, there is strong evidence that the conscious goal of US 
policy-makers has for some time been to launch a new such phase by overhauling its 
productive apparatus on the basis of ‘New Technology’.  There has been a prolonged 
investment boom in the US and a prolonged bull market in the US and other advanced-country 
stock markets and, were this to bring about a fundamental transformation in the productivity 
of the US economy, it would reduce or eliminate the US deficit and stabilise its relation to the 
world. 
Whether a new phase of world expansion will result from the past period of world contraction 
is an open question. At present, we simply do not know: we are in uncharted waters. It would as 
foolish to assume that every contraction must be followed by an expansion as it would be to 
assume that every contraction goes on for ever.  
There is certainly no evidence whatsoever of any expansive wave going on now, and it has to 
be said that the present phase of contraction is probably now the longest in history. Moreover 
there are profound structural obstacles to reconstituting US productivity. It requires intensive 
investment in the US way beyond what it has so far achieved, at the precise point when US 
resources are being ever more mobilised to be sent overseas. This is just another intractable 
element in the instability of present world economic relations. 
The point however is this: the last such expansive wave – in 1890-1914 – was very different 
from the expansion of 1947-65. Not all Kondratieffs are alike. At the last stage in history in 
which there was anything like an analogous phase of stagnation and divergence it gave way to 
a period of territorial conquest and great-nation position-building dominated by more or less 
open military conflict. 
A renewed expansion of the advanced powers, whether ot not if happens, is therefore an 
insufficient condition for an end to the unsustainable impoverishment of the great bulk of the 
world. Whether or not the current Great Depression comes to an end, the world is already in a 
new period in which the fate facing most of it is continued impoverishment, accompanied now 
by increasingly open recourse to political and military intervention – a period which I designate 
‘classical imperialism’. 
2 The poverty of globalisation 
The basic new facts of the world economic and political order therefore have profound 
theoretical consequences. Whether or not the historical period, as I will suggest, is a new period 
of classical imperialism, the facts of stagnation and divergence analysed above are with us 
already.  
Faced with facts on this scale, anyone who wants to change them has to understand them. The 
most basic problem of all is that the theories now current among both supporters and 
opponents of the new world order, simply do not explain them. To put this right, a profound 
theoretical re-assessment is required. 
Alan Freeman  the University of Greenwich 
2002f (The New Political Geography of Poverty).doc Page 7 of 34 05/04/07 
The most important consequence is for what I will term the ‘globalisation hypothesis’. In its 
strong form, which mixes normative and positive judgements but nevertheless constitutes an 
analytical and theoretical judgement, I will define this as the view that 
(1) the most useful way to understand the transformation of the world economy, and 
world politics, of the last twenty years is ‘globalisation’, a set of analytical constructs and 
causal theories which allow us to understand the movement of the world economy as a 
process of integration in which phenomena in the world market, and the world 
organisation of production, are steadily coming to determine the course of world 
events and dominate over the actions of national political institutions. 
(2) globalisation is neither recent nor transitory. It expresses fundamental long-term trends 
in the world which, although they may suffer temporary setbacks, cannot be reversed 
or halted. 
(3) Globalisation although it brings difficulties which must be attended to is a good and 
progressive thing; if well-managed, it will advance the well-being and prosperity of 
humanity as a whole. 
However although this strong view is that of the globalisers, the idea that globalisation helps 
explain what is happening in the world is not confined to their ranks and is almost universal. If 
the opponents of globalisation did not accept, in essence, the theory of globalisation, then 
they would not call it by that name, and they would not oppose it as such. 
Theses (1) and (2) above are, in fact, the common coin of almost all discussion on the present 
state of the world. However, they are incompatible with the facts. 
If the facts discussed above are not a consequence of globalisation but of something else, then 
globalisation theory fails to account for two of the most important things going on in the world 
and should be abandoned. There are clearly things going on about which the theory says 
nothing and which are in the process of wiping out much of what it predicts. It cannot be true, 
therefore, that the processes discussed by globalisation theory dominate world development. 
If on the other hand these trends are a consequence of globalisation, then since they act to 
dissolve and destroy it, globalisation cannot be a long-term process and cannot continue 
indefinitely. It must be a definite phase of history with definite limits, generated from within 
itself; these limits must inevitably at some point – and the evidence is that this point has arrived 
– give way to a new period of history with characteristics altogether different from those so far 
discussed by pro-globalisers and anti-globalisers alike.  
A crisis for the market, or a crisis of the market? 
The long-term slowdown in world production and the acceleration of world differentiation are 
both results of the operation of the market economy; in particular of market liberalisation and 
the extension of the world market. They are not natural or resource-imposed. 
This is not to say that present economic relations will not in future run up against absolute 
limits of world resources, or even that there are not serious problems with particular resources 
such as non-renewable fuels. The point is that these future dangers are not the cause of the 
present crisis. The current cause of world poverty and its accelerated growth is not our relation 
to nature but our relation to each other. Despite the slowdown in growth, as chart 2 above 
shows, income per world citizen at nearly $5,000 per year is, all proportions guarded, sixty 
percent higher than it was thirty years ago. Indeed, this level of world income is one of the 
fundamental achievements of the postwar Soviet era; at the end of the war, it did not exist.  
The evidence for an absolute Malthusian resource shortage is weak. Were the world’s wealth 
distributed equally, it would at this time feed, clothe, house, and educate everyone in the 
world, keep them free from disease and provide them with a dignified retirement. The problem 
is, for now, not the creation of wealth but what is done with it. 
It is, I will try to establish, equally unsound to attribute the new phase of the world’s economy 
to exogenous, historical, institutional or malign non-market factors – antiquated culture, 
incompatible civilisations, bad monetary management, terrorism, communism, oil sheikhs or 
anticapitalist aliens. The renewed acceleration of divergence began precisely at the moment 
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when the world market was liberalised.  
Stagnation, it is true, was already setting in in the sense of slowing growth and reduced 
profitabilty. But it did not translate itself into an absolute reduction in wealth-creating capacity 
until the current decade. Moreover the specific combination of stagnation with divergence has 
not been seen for such a prolonged period in this century.  
Most significant of all, every time the market got more liberal, stagnation and divergence both 
got worse. They happened when the market was liberalised, and grew in direct proportion to 
its extent. It requires a great deal of explaining to justify the idea that they are caused, 
therefore, by something other than the market. The first great wave of impoverishment, in the 
1980s, dates from the epoch of trade liberalisation, the transformation of GATT into the WTO 
and the introduction of multilateral free trade, the onset of large-scale deregulation and 
privatisation launched by Reagan and Thatcher, and the creation, as a result of the way that the 
IMF and World Bank managed the debt crisis, of a fully open world market in capital. The 
second great wave in the 1990s opened when the Eastern European economies were plunged 
into this newly liberalised world market. 
Do institutions matter?The need for theoretical renewal 
When the hidden hand shakes, a more visible one takes its place, generally shaking a big stick. 
Thus institutions, politics and culture are far from insignificant in history. To the contrary, it is 
precisely because the market is failing to organise the human race in a stable or sustainable 
manner that such factors are returning to stage centre – contrary to the globalisation 
hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, the timing and extent of the new trends in the world’s economy simply do not 
support the idea that external or non-economic factors are its prime cause. Their coincidence in 
both time and extent with market liberalisation are so precise that, if one seeks to explain them 
by any other means, one must in effect abandon the theoretical view that the market functions 
with any autonomy from institutional and political agency at all. 
It is indeed true that the world market does not in fact function as claimed by its ardent 
supporters. Stiglitz has pointed out on the basis of intimate and direct knowledge, the rules of 
the free market are rigged. (ref) The advanced countries have ensured through their 
manipulative use of anti-dumping procedures, through bypassing GATT rules in Free Trade 
Areas which they control, and through protectionism pure and simple, that the GATT and WTO 
rules de facto functions as a free market for advanced country products, not for the products of 
the poor countries (see for example Freeman 2000). And as for the market in capital, as Peter 
Gowan (0000) documents very effectively, the USA has been able to use its status as the world’s 
dominant financial power, as the manager of the world currency, and through its direct and 
indirect control over the IMF and World Bank, to arrange the functioning of the world financial 
system entirely to suit its own domestic economic needs. Indeed, an attempt to suggest what 
the mechanisms and processes involved are the purpose of this paper. 
But this does not come to the help of globalisation theory or, for that matter, neoliberal theory. 
If the real mechanisms of the last two decades are not the automatic processes of the market, 
but the more or less direct result of state intervention, then it makes no sense to argue that the 
role of the state has diminished, and that non-national or other autonomous forces are 
determining the real course of history, or indeed that the market is a particularly useful 
institution. All that has really happened is that one particular state has got very powerful and 
the others have got very weak; in short the problem facing the world is the rather old and 
rather traditional one of the political relation between states and peoples. 
Either way, globalisation theory, essentially, is analytically inadequate. It provides neither a 
satisfactory explanation of events, nor a conceptual framework with which to construct a better 
one. 
The underlying facts are so crucial to the argument, they must first therefore be assessed with 
more care and in greater detail. With this done, the next step is to examine the underlying 
causes. Finally, I will try to survey some of the possible explanations, past and present, which 
may help present an analytical framework adequate to group these causes into an adequate 
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theoretical explanation. 
3 The globalisation of poverty 
World stagnation 
Chart 4 shows how annual growth rates have moved since market liberalisation began. The 
downward general trend is absolutely clear. Although increasingly wild cyclic swings can give 
rise to the appearance of strong growth depending on the period of time that is considered, 
the graph shows strong phenomena that are independent of cyclic variations.  
Successive peaks since 1987 are all below the average growth rate of the seventies, and the 
peak of 1987 is itself accentuated because it is a rebound from the exceptional trough that 
lasted from 1979 until 1985. Moreover as Chart 5 shows, the number of years during the 
preceding decade in which growth was negative has risen systematically, and the point has 
been reached where world growth is now negative more than half the time; since 1989 it has 
been negative for at least five of any given ten years except the decade ending in 1995. 
Chart 4: annual growth rate of world GDP in constant 1995 dollars 
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Judgements on growth depend on the measure adopted. World GDP, measured in dollars, rises 
and falls with exchange rates. In choosing the dollar as unit of measurement, are I not merely 
reporting its fortunes on the FOREX markets, rather than any real indicator of growth? 
The interpretation of dollar data is therefore contested. The more uncomfortable the 
conclusions which arise from simple dollar calculations, the more attention the world financial 
authorities give to alternative measures such as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars, which 
are adjusted to reflect the local cost of living and, since costs are generally lower in poorer 
countries, provide higher estimates of the income of poor people. 
Actually, the very fact that dollar GDP is diverging from PPP GDP signifies that something new 
is going on. Thirty years ago world was rising unambiguously, and now it is not; the most 
definite statement that can be made, by anyone who wishes to argue that world output is still 
rising, is that this view is supported only if one measures output in one particular way. 
But as is the case with any fundamental fact, there are underlying trends so stark that they 
impose themselves on any measure. Even in PPPs, UNCTAD in 2002 reported that in the 39 
Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) at the end of the sixties 211 million people were living on an 
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income of less than $2 per day in PPPs. By the end of the ninetees there were 448 million, an 
increase of over 100 per cent. 
It is however hard to sustain the argument that dollar GDP understates long-term growth. Over 
the last two decades the dollar has systematically appreciated against against the main world 
currencies in both nominal and real terms. For this reason if, for example, growth is measured 
in an alternative such as the Yen, the result is an even more decisive decline in world GDP, as 
table 2 demonstrates. 
Chart 5: years of negative growth in past decade 
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Table 2: Annual growth of world GDP per capita in Yen 
 GDP GDP per capita 
70-80 47.11% 44.60% 
80-90 31.54% 29.34% 
90-00 -6.45% -7.63% 
To say the least, if IMF and World Bank reports were drawn up in Yen there would be some 
explaining to do. 
Behind this however lies a more fundamental issue. Output is always measured in a national 
currency – there is no world currency, in the sense of a money that is accepted as legal tender 
in every country in the world. However the dollar is however the nearest thing to it. The 
overwhelming bulk of international transactions are conducted in it. It is legal tender in a 
growing number of countries, with the assent and approval of world financial authorities. 
Where it is not legal tender, there are few who will not accept it. De facto it is world currency. 
National currencies do exist, and dollar prices do differ from country to country, because to the 
extent that the cost of goods is determined by national and not global circumstances, they will 
be produced at local prices which differ from global ones. 
PPPs compare living standards in national economies independent of currency variations. They 
are fictitious exchanges rates which take account of local national costs. Where these are low, 
the PPP exchange rate is higher than the actual market rate. Thus the GDP of India measured in 
1996 PPPs was $1,783 billion but in dollars $441.7 billion, because a dollar in India buys, it is 
calculated, 1,783/441.7 = 4 times as much as it would in the USA. 
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Measured in PPPs, the world economy performs substantially better than in dollars as shown in 
Chart 6, taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook for 2002 (table 1) 
Chart 6 
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Source: World Economic Outlook 2002, table 1  
PPP measures of GDP, whose prime purpose is to facilitate comparison between countries, 
have become a distorted measure of their aggregate output. They inflate the contribution to 
world output of countries with low prices, and diminish those with high prices. They record 
increased growth for countries whose prices in national currency are rising more slowly than 
their prices in dollars. In the late 80s and above all the 90s, this exaggerated the contribution of 
the poor countries and underplayed the peformance of the rich ones as shown in charts 7 and 
8 comparing the distribution of world income in terms of dollar GDP and in terms of the PPPs 
published by the International Comparison Project (ICP) which spearheads the development of 
PPP measures. 
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Chart 7: shares of world GDP in 1990 PPPs 
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PPP-based GDP records an higher, and increasing share for the poorer countries than dollar 
GDP, most strikingly for Asia which includes India and China.2 
Chart 8: shares of world GDP in dollars 
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This offers a key insight in relation to the increasingly strident and open argument between 
                                                             
2 Countries in each region are listed at the end of this chapter. ‘Rest of the World’ groups Africa, the Middle East, Countries in 
Transition and the ‘Western Hemisphere’ – essentially South America, and contained 1,897 million people in 2000. The Euro Area 
contained 389 million, North America 306 million, South-East Asia 182 million and Asia 3,085 million. 
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world development agencies such as UNCTAD, and the international financial institutions. 
UNCTAD shares an analytical consensus to measure output in PPPs which stretches across 
world institutions and many NGOs, because at the level of the very poorest people such as the 
LDCs it presents incontrovertible evidence of a genocidal level of deprivation, as we will see. 
Nevertheless these measures obscure the underlying dynamics above all in world output. The 
principal cause of divergence between the two measures of world output, aside from the 
general tendency of PPPs to exaggerate poor country output, are the specific effects of China 
and India. These two enormous Asian countries are in a special relation to the world market by 
sheer virtue of their size and hence the extent of their internal market. 
Moreover China is a very specific case which is singled out precisely by the fact that, unlike the 
USSR, it did not follow IMF prescriptions, has not transformed itself into a model IMF economy, 
and has an entirely different ownership structure in which over two-thirds of its production 
remains outside the private market in capital. There is no room for doubt that China has 
undergone a prodigious, and in terms of world history, completely exceptional phase of 
growth. This can hardly, however, be attributed to globalisation; the whole point is that the role 
of the Chinese state has indeed dominated over market and global processes. If, therefore, one 
wishes to assess the impact of the market and of global processes as such, exception should be 
made of China. 
As chart 9 shows, precisely during the last two decades, the proportions in which China and 
India contribute to world real GDP according to the PPP measure have more than doubled and 
they are now counted at four times the worth that their product fetches on the world market. 
Although they remain low-income countries, their huge combined population means that this 
has a major distorting effect on world real output usually reported by the world financial 
institutions. 
Chart 9: ratio of nominal to PPP GDP 
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Chart 10 shows how this affects measures of world GDP. Measured peak to peak, if GDP is 
presented including India and China its growth rate shows no decline between 1979 and 1985 
and falls by only half a percent from the 1979 to the 1996 peak. Without China and India 
growth nearly halves over the latter period, from 5.3 per cent to 3.3 per cent. 
But this arises not because of the participation of India and particularly China in the world 
market but because they are differentiated from it. Indeed this has rendered China the de facto 
number one target of US military policy.  
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This exception proves the rule. The global decline in world GDP is understated in PPPs only 
because of the specific and exceptional situation of the two largest countries in the world; that 
is, it is the exception to globalisation and not the impact of globalisation that offsets its general 
impact on world poverty; second, in all those countries that do not enjoy the very particular 
advantages of China and India, the trend to poverty and differentiation is accelerated. 
 
Chart 10: PPP measures of world GDP growth 
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More generally the departure of PPP output from dollar output is an indicator of a real process. 
If PPP and dollar measures of output diverge over time, it means local prices are departing from 
world prices; in short, national prices are becoming less economically homogeneous under the 
impact of market liberalisation. 
There is thus an analytical choice to be made when measuring output. If over time world prices 
were converging (as, indeed both the globalisation hypothesis and neoliberal theory predict) 
then no qualitative issue would be involved as the trends in both measures would be the same. 
Since they are diverging, however, the two measures give different qualitative results. The issue 
is not nececssarily that one is better or worse than the other, but that they measure different 
things. Used as a measur of aggregate output, PPPs capture trends of divergence in local prices 
and present them as if they were an increase in productive power, which they are not. 
This brings us to the point which I consider most decisive. What is the purpose of measuring 
output? To understand the dynamics of growth, we have to deal with the source of growth, 
namely investment. Investment, however, is determined by access to productive resources, 
which for the vast majority of technologically-advanced capital goods, are acquired in dollars. If 
a country sells products for less dollars than their real worth, this is an event in the real world; 
the country then has less actual dollars to spend. No one has yet succeeded in taking a PPP 
dollar to market to buy machinery with and if they did, capitalism as we know it would cease to 
exist. 
GDP faces both ways; it measures what the world consumes, and what it produces. As a 
measure of welfare – consumption – PPPs may permit a more accurate assessment of the actual 
living conditions. But as a measure of output, they avoid the very confrontation the world 
market imposes. It is true that it costs less to live in most African countries than in Japan, 
Europe or America. But an African capitalist or farmer must not just eat, but compete. Dollar 
GDP measures the wealth-creating capacity of nations in the global market. Above all it 
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measures their purchasing-power over capital goods and this is what determines whether they 
rise or fall in the wealth-creating stakes. Ultimately, if only with a  delay, an inability to purchase 
and deploy capital goods translates itself into an inability to produce what a people require for 
life and the pursuit of happiness. World-wide, the growth rate of these quantities is falling 
relatively and for a rising proportion of the world, it is falling absolutely. 
4 The globalisation of divergence 
Even in PPPs, poverty is clearly increasing in the modern world. This is one of the principal 
reasons a consensus exists, from the right to the left of the spectrum of development 
economics, around the measurement of  
This is the key to understanding table 21 from the UNCTAD report, reproduced here as table 2. 
This shows a rising trend of poverty in the LDCs and a falling trend in the rest of the developed 
world. 
Table 2. Poverty trends in LDCs and other developing countries, 1965–1999 
1985 PPP $2-a-day international poverty line 
 1965–
1969 
1975–
1979 
1985–1989 1995–
1999 
Population living on less than $2 a day (%)     
39 LDCs 80.8 82.1 81.9 80.7 
Of which:African LDCs 82.0 83.7 87.0 87.5 
Of which: Asian LDCs 78.8 79.6 73.4 68.2 
22 other developing countries 82.8 76.5 61.6 35.3 
Number of people living on less than $2 a day (millions) 
39 LDCs 211.1 277.5 360.5 449.3 
Of which: African LDCs 131.7 174.4 239.5 315.1 
Of which: Asian LDCs 79.1 102.9 120.3 133.3 
22 other developing countries 1,405.0 1,639.7 1,599.0 1,084.2 
Total 1,615.8 1,917 1,958.8 1,532.6 
Average daily consumption of those living below $2 a day (1985 PPP $) 
39 LDCs 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.03 
African LDCs 0.95 0.96 0.90 0.86 
Asian LDCs 1.27 1.27 1.37 1.42 
22 other developing countries 1.17 1.30 1.53 1.65 
Source: Karshenas, UNCTAD report on LDC poverty 2002 
These figures are shocking. Even so they understate the real process at work in the world, 
which is not confined to the impoverishment of a relative ‘minority’ of the world’s people in the 
Less Developed Countries. Actually, the era of market liberalisation has seen the 
impoverishment of almost the entire third world relative to the advanced countries, and the 
absolute impoverishment of the majority of it. This was moreover accompanied by 
(1) at the end of the millenium, a significant deterioration following the ‘Asian’ crisis in the 
condition of even that small group of developing countries such as the NIACs that had 
been catching up with the advanced nations in the preceding thirty years 
(2) the outbreak of increasingly hostile competition even among the advanced countries, 
leading to significant deterioration in the Japanese and European economies, relative 
to the United States 
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Chart 11: The divergence of GDP per capita 
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As chart 11 and Table 3 show, between 1980 and 2000 the relation between the advanced or 
advancing countries as a whole (comprising here North America, the Euro Zone, Japan and the 
advanced South-East Asian countries) and the rest of the world went through a qualitative 
evolution. GDP per capita of the rich nearly doubled; that of the rest of the world fell by around 
30% -- more, from its 1980 peak of $1,683 to its 1999 trough of $1,116. 
Table 3: GDP per capita in 1995 dollars 
 1982 2000 
Rest of the World 1,457 1,116 
Advanced or Advancing Countries 15,383 26,134 
 
This, however, is only part of the story. Differentiation has proceeded at every level of the world 
economy. In the first place this produced a further stratification within the major geographical 
regions of the developing world, most notably in its effect on Africa but also in its dramatic 
impact on the countries in transition and, significantly, the Middle East. 
 
Alan Freeman  the University of Greenwich 
2002f (The New Political Geography of Poverty).doc Page 17 of 34 05/04/07 
Chart 12: growth of GDP per capital 1980-2000 
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(Section to be added on unevenness of development within each region) 
Finally and most significantly, within the advanced and advancing countries a wholly new 
development took place in the 1990s; ths significance of this will emerge in assessing the boom 
and bust and the significance of the world stock market crash and the current recession. 
As can be seen from chart 11, during the 80s although the Third World and subsequently the 
countries of the ex-USSR and Eastern Europe suffered a rapid relative (and in many cases 
absolute) decline in output per capita, among the advanced and advancing countries, growth 
rates persisted or rose. 
In the 90s this situation was absolutely and decisively reversed, leading most significantly to 
the 1997 Asian crisis.  
As chart 12 shows, the 80s were dominated by the rise of Japan and the newly-industrialising 
countries; Europe was still advancing and US growth remained low relative to its chief partners 
and rivals. 
In the 90s the US took the lead in growth. It did  so, however, not by raising its own contribution 
to the growth of the world’s wealth but by reducing everyone else’s. US growth became, for the 
rest of the world, synonymous with its own  stagnation. 
This type of world growth is completely the opposite of that which took place during the 
‘golden age’ of the late 40s, 1950s and early 60s. In this phase, not only did the USA manifest 
qualitatively higher growth rates; it took the rest of the world with it. US hegemony in this 
period was based not merely on its military superiority but on a decisive economic contribution 
that it made, at least to its principal partners in the Cold War. The US was in surplus. It was the 
most productive country in the world, at one and the same time the most technologically 
advanced, the richest, the greatest capital exporter, and the military and financial guarantor of 
the rest of the advanced world. 
In a nutshell, the USA’s military and financial dominance was in balance with its productive 
dominance. The mutually benign relation between its political and its economic role permitted 
it a hegemony based on a real material benefits that it brought to most of the countries that 
were subordinated to it. 
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Chart 12: Growth rates in GDP per capita of the advanced country regions 
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Chart 13: GDP per capital relative to that of the USA 
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This situation has reversed. The last quarter of the century is dominated by the relative decline 
of the USA and its inability to hegemonise the rest of the world by raising its productive 
capacity. Instead, the US is ever more insistently driven, by an inevitably economic logic, to use 
its military and financial weight to offset its productive weakness, manifested most starkly in its 
ineradicable trade deficit but also in the brutal facts of a world being torn apart by the USA’s 
fundamental economic incapacity to bring that world forward. 
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5 Greenspan’s failed fifth kondratieff 
The long-term process of stagnation which has accentuated, on a world scale, during the last 
two decades, has been accompanied by a contradictory phenomenon, on which the attention 
of the world has been focussed. Thus is the gigantic run-up of share prices and values – and 
their subsequent fall – in advanced-country financial markets. 
Not only the present fall in share values, but the rise that preceded it, are as unprecedented as 
the two-decade-long period of stagnation and divergence we have just lived through. 
Chart 00, using data taken from Shiller (0000) ‘Irrational Exuberance’ and provided by the 
author on his website, shows that there have been only three run-ups of share prices like the 
present in the last 130 years; the 1916-29 pre-crash bull, a prolonged but slow expansion of 
1946-66, and the present run-up which is comprised of a slow run beginning in 1980 and a 
marked acceleration in 1986. 
Chart 00: Standard and Poor’s Composite Share Index 1871-2002 
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The difficulty in assessing the relative scale of increases or falls in stock market prices is always 
to compare rises at different points in time when the start point is so different.  
The index rose from trough to peak from 211 to 1432 between 1981 and 2002, and from 63 to 
305 between 1921 and 1929. From 1951 to 1969 it rose from 108 to 473. Which was the ‘largest’ 
rise?  
Table 00 
Date  Low point High point Growth Annualised Growth 
1921 1929 63 305 384.13% 21.79% 
1951 1969 108 473 337.96% 8.55% 
1981 2002 211 1432 578.67% 10.6% 
 
The annual growth of the 1980s was bigger than any since 1921-29. However this understates 
its significance. Growth rates in the 1950s were historically higher and so returns were higher. If 
we divide the stock market index by the GDP, and re-index it to 1943, we obtain a measure of 
the rise or fall of stock market prices above or below the general level of economic activity. This 
results in chart 00. 
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Chart 00: Standard and Poor divided by US Nominal GDP, 1943=100 
 
It then becomes clear that a ‘spike’ started in 1995 but, to render the comparison accurate it 
must also be noted that the real bull run of the 20s did not begin until 1924, the previous 3 
years being a period of high inflation; a true comparison is obtained by comparing the run-up, 
therefore, between 1924-29 on the one hand, and 1995-2000 on the other, which are also the 
same length of time.  
Table 00 
Date  Low point High point Growth Annualised Growth 
1924 1929 194 476 145.36% 19.66% 
1951 1969 112 232 107.14% 4.13% 
1981 2000 83 285 243.37% 6.05% 
1995 2000 123 285 131.71% 18.35% 
For completeness, and in order to study this period in comparison with the 1870s we make a 
further correction by indexing the S&P not to the value of output but to the quantity of labour 
in this output. We treat a dollar as representing an aliquot share of the labour involved in 
producing the wealth in existence and deflate every price accordingly. We then end up with a 
chart in which the vertical axis gives us, effectively, the quantity of labour that the shares in the 
market can be exchanged for. 
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Chart 00: S&P in labour units, 1943 = 100 
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Th
e present run-up is not on a scale that compares with anything else since the war. It is among 
the largest in history. It goes without saying that over no other five-year period is there a rise of 
this scale. Moreover chart 00 gives an indication of the historical repetition; in each of the last 
three Kondratieff downturns, the downturn has been accompanied by a share price upswing, in 
the last two a spike. 
Notwithstanding the enormous attention given to the idea that liberalisation in the capital 
markets would unleash a flood of accumulation in the third world, nothing comparable has 
taken place there. Chart 00 shows the 2002 Dollar value of share indexes on the world’s 
principal emerging markets, taken from the Economist. In only two cases are they worth more 
than they were ten years ago: Brasil, which is already entering the post-Argentina crisis which 
has been looming for the past two years; China, which we have already discussed, and the 
small and exceptional case of Hungary. A dollar invested in almost any advanced country 
market, even after the bursting of the share bubble, would be worth somewhere between 
three and eight times as much as it was at the start of this decade. A dollar invested in an 
emerging country market has never risen above 3.5 times its initial value, and this only for a 
brief period in Brasil and Hungary; for the rest it has never risen above 2.5 times its initial value, 
and is now almost everywhere worth less than it started out at. 
This tremendous disparity in the performance of capital markets reflects not only the 
tremendous disparity in the performance of business but the underlying force that has driven 
up share prices in the advanced world, well above the level corresponding to the income that 
they generate – namely, an enormous flux of  capital into these markets and above all into the 
share markets of the USA. 
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Chart 00: emerging market dollar share index values at May 2002 relative to January 1993=100 
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Postwar economic dynamics 
To understand this process it is necessary to turn to the driving forces behind the expansionary 
wave that preceded the 1980s; namely the relation between savings and investment. 
The driving force of growth is investment. In the early postwar years, investment rates in South-
East Asia reached historically unprecedented levels, facilitating sustained annual growth 
ratesof 8% and over. Growth at this rate has projected economies such as Korea from relative 
backwardness to the standards of a modern industrial state within a generation. 
Investment, the principal driver of accumulation and hence growth, is financed out of a 
definite, but limited quantity of capital. Capital may not be created out of nothing; like 
Shakespeare’s spirits of the deep it may not be summoned into existence by decree. It arises 
out of production. It is that (accumulated) part of output that remains unconsumed and is 
deployed in pursuit of profit; output in turn arises from human labour, whose magnitude is set 
absolutely by the size of the economically active population and the hours for which it works.  
This quantitative limit expresses itself as an aggregate monetary relation that is recognised in 
the national accounting framework; total world savings equals total world investment. Each 
nation, therefore, can finance its investment ultimately from only one of two sources: from its 
own savings, or by borrowing from other nations. 
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Investment as share of total GDP, G7+Korea
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Figure 3b 
Again to abstract from all effects except regional difference, figure 3a shows the investment of 
each region, as a share of the total GDP of all regions. Figure 3b shows the same magnitudes 
accumulated or ‘stacked’, so that the top line shows the total investment of the advanced 
countries, as a proportion of the GDP of the advanced countries. Figure 3a illustrates the 
constraint of the quantity of capital, and figure 3b exhibits its effects. The relative shares of 
investment have changed dramatically, but their total has remained remarkably stable, rising 
from 17% in 1952 to 22% in 1973 and thereafter never falling below 19% or rising above 22%. 
The investment share of North America in contrast fell from 11% to 5% between 1957 and 1991 
while South-East Asia's rose from 1% to 9%. 
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Figure 4a 
Figure 4a shows a different but related quantity; the investment rate of each region, that is, the 
proportion of that region’s GDP which is invested; figure 4b shows the same for the European 
countries. These two figures exibit a further, and equally important point: although the USA 
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successfully restored its investment rate nearly to its postwar peak of 22% of GDP, and 
although Japan’s investment rate fell to a postwar low, nevertheless throughout the period 
Japan’s absolute investment rate remained above that of the USA. For this reason, and despite 
the prolonged Japanese economic crisis, there is no indication the USA has overcome the basic 
productivity advantage in trade which Japan established during 1950-1980. To the contrary, as 
we shall now see, the US’s failure to overcome this productivity gap is the source of a persistent 
US balance of payments deficit which is, if anything, worsening. 
In like manner, although the UK experienced a steady and quite prolonged investment surge 
parallelling that of the US, at the end of this surge the proportion of its output being invested 
remained below that of every other advanced industrial nation, with the result that in the 
present recession, the trade deficit appears to have returned to haunt it. In the next section we 
consider why this might be. 
Investment as the driver of growth 
Investment cuts costs, that is, raises productivity. The criterion which allocates market-driven 
investment is that it should yield a higher than average profit, which, if the product is sold into 
a single uniform market at a uniform world price, can only be achieved by reducing unit costs. 
But if unit costs are reduced, by definition productivity rises and hence output. It is in this way 
that the profit motive translates into a growth imperative. This produces three distinct but 
related effects.  
• The investing nation grows economically; it produces more goods for the same amount 
of consumed capital.  
• If a nation raises its productivity higher or faster than another then it achieves a 
consistently higher profit rate; it outperforms and outcompetes the less productive 
nation. 
• The profit rate declines secularly as long as investment continues, since investment 
accumulates, that is, augments the total stock of capital representing claims on total 
profits. The profit rate is restored periodically by means of crisis, an abrupt suspension of 
accumulation.3 
                                                             
3 The profit rate differs depending on whether it is measured in terms of money, use-value, or hours of labour. The law of the 
tendential fall in the profit rate applies to hours of labour. 
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Figure 4b 
US Investment and savings % of GDP
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Figure 5 
For a given nation, the first effect may outweigh the third and thus a nation or region may 
escape a falling world profit rate, if it can outcompete its rivals in the race to raise productivity. 
The more a nation or region invests, the more marked these effects. Nations may of course 
circumvent the restrictions of their purses by cunning techniques to direct investment where it 
is most effective and we shall see that the US investment boom of the 1990s was exceptionally, 
and probably consciously, directed into ICT (Information and Communication Technology). 
However I know of no evidence that such techniques can overcome the fundamental 
quantitative relation which is, the more investment, the faster the rise in productivity. I know of 
no case where sustained high investment has produced sustained low growth, or vice versa. 
The relative rates of investment of nations or regions therefore offer a key quantitative 
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indicator of the relative strengths both of the fundamental economic forces driving up their 
output and living standards, and the forces that tend to change their relative competitive 
positions. 
Both figures 3a and 3b clearly identify the basis of the extraordinarily rise of South-East Asia 
from 3% to 30% of world GDP in 40 years from 1954 to 1994; namely, its unprecedented 
investment rate, never less than a quarter of its output. Second, they identify the basis of 
Europe’s steady but less spectacular improvement relative to North America. Finally they 
illustrate how and why North America, and the USA in particular, have been able to rise again 
to the top of the GDP growth league among the advanced industrial nations, on the back of a 
sustained investment boom. 
However, it is not so simple, on the basis of a mere ten years of relatively faster investment 
growth, at rates which are nevertheless lower than those nations that have invested at 
considerably greater rates for most of the second half of the century, to overcome the 
cumulative disadvantage that has resulted. 
In consequence the US’s expansion of the 1990s has been financed on a completely different 
basis to that of the world’s 1950-1990 ‘golden age’ expansion. 
World instability provoked by US growth 
The ten-year growth of US output is dominated by its prolonged ten-year expansion of 
investment. Between 1990 and 2000 GDP expanded by 8% as a proportion of the GDP of the 
G7 countries; investment by 4%. However, as is also indicated by GDP trends, this was not the 
result of a world expansion; it happened because the US grew at the expense of the other 
advanced industrial nations, whose investment contracted, again reversing postwar trends. 
Figure 6 
Japan Investment and Savings (% of GDP)
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This is a fundamental source of instability of the global economy. Figure 5 exhibits a different 
facet of the same two periods already noted: up till 1980, US investment was financed from 
internal savings, which always exceeded investment. This reversed in 1980 and savings from 
then on fell behind investment. This was particularly marked in the 1990s expansion in which 
savings and investment moved in opposite directions. 
As figure 6 shows, the Japanese savings-investment relation since 1980 is more or less the 
reverse of this. The money for US investment comes from abroad, which manifests itself in 
persistent US balance of payments deficits and persistent South-East Asian surplusses. 
However as figure 7 shows, this relation emerged out of the turning point of 1980.  This graph 
shows how much investment is financed out of domestic sources. It exhibits net borrowing 
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(savings minus investment) as a proportion of investment. 
Figure 7 
Net lending as share of investment
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Essentially the world financial system acts as a vacuum cleaner to draw these trade surpluses 
into the financing of US investment. The basic sources of finance are South-East Asia and to a 
lesser extent, the Third World, as figure 8 shows.  
Figure 8. Source: IMF Economic Outlook October 2000 
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The impact of 1980s trade and financial deregulation was to mobilise world capital around US 
expansion. However in consequence US expansion was purchased at the expense of the 
expansion of the rest of the world economy. 
This exhibits the significant difference between the US/North American expansion of 1990-
2000, and the ‘Golden Age’ worldwide expansion of 1947-65. The postwar world expansion was 
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financed by the net export of capital from the major industrial powers and above all US capital. 
The expanding powers were therefore, in a basic sense, the motor of growth. The US expansion 
of the 1990s has been financed by the net import of capital from the rest of the world and 
above all from South East Asia. The mechanism is as follows:  
• The US emerged from World War II with a substantial productivity advantage which 
translated itself into a competitive advantage in world trade, yielding a surplus profit. 
• For political and economic reasons, the US did not invest this surplus profit but exported 
it as capital to the rest of the world, where it was absorbed in domestic investment 
particularly in Germany and Japan. As the defeated in the war they could not be 
permitted to redevelop external spheres of political or economic influence; nevertheless, 
they had to be shored up as a bulwark against communism. This led to a highly intensive 
mode of development in which they regained their strength in world markets by means 
of a so far unprecedented level of investment and hence technical advance. 
• Meanwhile the UK, as the US’s junior partner, continued to pursue an extensive model of 
development founded in the export of capital, but without the productivity advantage 
that would allow it to finance these capital exports through a stable trade surplus. In 
consequence it suffered the now well-known, almost classical symptoms of the ‘British 
malaise’; the steady loss of industrial superiority, regular devaluation crises and a 
systemic trade decifit. 
• The entire period of extended and rapid accumulation that opened in the 1950s gave 
rise, through the accumulation of capital stock, to a prolonged decline in the world 
general rate of profit (see Freeman 1999) leading to what we term a generalised crisis: a 
slowdown or suspension of accumulation in all nations, the return of synchronised trade 
cycle crises in 1974, 1980, 1989 and now 1999. The return of mass unemployment, and 
extensive political and economic turbulence. 
• In this situation, the US and to a lesser extent the UK launched, in the early 1980s, a 
political programme aimed at restructuring the world economy: the ‘neoclassical 
counterrevolution’ as Todaro (1974) puts it which included widespread deregulation, the 
re-imposition through the WTO of a uniform world market for the products of the 
advanced countries, the creation of a world market in intellectual property through WIPO 
and other means, the opening up to capital of the markets of the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern bloc, the breakup of protectionist policies in the third world, and so on. 
• The programme had twin objectives; on the one hand, to restructure relations between 
the advanced countries as a whole and the rest of the world, principally to create a 
genuine world market including a world market in capital, enabling global economies of 
scale which would open the door to larger-scale investment than hitherto; on the other 
hand, to enable the USA, through its domination of the world commercial and financial 
system which arose from the dollar’s world role and the US’s political and military pre-
eminence, to secure advantages in the commercial and financial sphere which could 
offset its productive weakness. 
• It is now clear that a third potential function of the programme, for the USA, was an 
attempt to restore its productive pre-eminence. A potential outcome of the ten-year rise 
in US investment, above all if it is maintained through the recession, is the restructuring 
of the US economy so as to re-establish the productive lead that it held after world war II. 
It is clear that this is what US policymakers hope for. 
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7 Appendix: Classifications used 
I have modified the standard IMF regions to reflect the historical evolution and the economic 
and geographical insertion of the countries under study. The IMF regional classification is a mix 
of developmental and geographical categories. On the one hand it places Japan in the group of 
‘Advanced’ nations and on the other, divides up the countries in Transition for geographical 
purposes to create a category ‘Middle East and Europe’. Our category of South-East Asia places 
Japan with the group of NIACs and geographically proximate advanced countries whose 
economic evolution proceeds in parallel with it. Our category of Middle East confines itself to 
the Middle East properly speaking. But on the other hand I have kept all Countries in Transition 
together to reflect their parallel origin over the two decades under study. 
Bureau of Census Name Modified IMF Region 
Algeria                             Africa 
Angola                              Africa 
Benin                               Africa 
Botswana                            Africa 
Burkina Faso                        Africa 
Burundi                             Africa 
Cameroon                            Africa 
Cape Verde                          Africa 
Central African Republic            Africa 
Chad                                Africa 
Comoros                             Africa 
Congo (Brazzaville) Africa 
Congo (Kinshasa) Africa 
Cote d'Ivoire                       Africa 
Djibouti                            Africa 
Equatorial Guinea                   Africa 
Eritrea                             Africa 
Ethiopia                            Africa 
Gabon                               Africa 
Gambia, The                         Africa 
Ghana                               Africa 
Guinea                              Africa 
Guinea-Bissau                       Africa 
Kenya                               Africa 
Lesotho                             Africa 
Liberia                             Africa 
Madagascar                          Africa 
Malawi                              Africa 
Mali                                Africa 
Mauritania                          Africa 
Mauritius                           Africa 
Morocco                             Africa 
Mozambique                          Africa 
Nauru                               Africa 
Niger                               Africa 
Nigeria                             Africa 
Rwanda                              Africa 
Sao Tome and Principe               Africa 
Senegal                             Africa 
Seychelles                          Africa 
Sierra Leone                        Africa 
Somalia                             Africa 
South Africa                        Africa 
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Sudan                               Africa 
Swaziland                           Africa 
Tanzania                            Africa 
Togo                                Africa 
Tunisia                             Africa 
Uganda                              Africa 
Zambia                              Africa 
Zimbabwe                            Africa 
Myanmar  Asia 
Afghanistan                         Asia 
Bangladesh                          Asia 
Bhutan                              Asia 
Brunei                              Asia 
Cambodia                            Asia 
China                               Asia 
Fiji                                Asia 
India                               Asia 
Indonesia                           Asia 
Kiribati                            Asia 
Laos                                Asia 
Malaysia                            Asia 
Maldives                            Asia 
Marshall Islands                    Asia 
Micronesia, Federated States of     Asia 
Nepal                               Asia 
Pakistan                            Asia 
Papua New Guinea                    Asia 
Philippines                         Asia 
Samoa                               Asia 
Solomon Islands                     Asia 
Sri Lanka                           Asia 
Thailand                            Asia 
Tonga                               Asia 
Vanuatu                             Asia 
Vietnam                             Asia 
Albania                             Countries in Transition 
Armenia                             Countries in Transition 
Azerbaijan                          Countries in Transition 
Belarus                             Countries in Transition 
Bosnia and Herzegovina              Countries in Transition 
Bulgaria                            Countries in Transition 
Croatia                             Countries in Transition 
Czech Republic                      Countries in Transition 
Estonia                             Countries in Transition 
Georgia                             Countries in Transition 
Hungary                             Countries in Transition 
Kazakhstan                          Countries in Transition 
Kyrgyzstan                          Countries in Transition 
Latvia                              Countries in Transition 
Lithuania                           Countries in Transition 
Macedonia, The Former Yugo. Rep. of Countries in Transition 
Moldova                             Countries in Transition 
Mongolia                            Countries in Transition 
Montenegro                          Countries in Transition 
Poland                              Countries in Transition 
Romania                             Countries in Transition 
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Russia                              Countries in Transition 
Serbia                              Countries in Transition 
Slovakia                            Countries in Transition 
Slovenia                            Countries in Transition 
Tajikistan                          Countries in Transition 
Turkmenistan                        Countries in Transition 
Ukraine                             Countries in Transition 
Uzbekistan                          Countries in Transition 
Austria                             Euro Area 
Belgium                             Euro Area 
Denmark                             Euro Area 
Finland                             Euro Area 
France                              Euro Area 
Germany                             Euro Area 
Greece                              Euro Area 
Iceland                             Euro Area 
Ireland                             Euro Area 
Italy                               Euro Area 
Luxembourg                          Euro Area 
Netherlands                         Euro Area 
Norway                              Euro Area 
Portugal                            Euro Area 
Spain                               Euro Area 
Sweden                              Euro Area 
Switzerland                         Euro Area 
United Kingdom                      Euro Area 
Bahrain                             Middle East and Europe 
Cyprus                              Middle East and Europe 
Egypt                               Middle East and Europe 
Iran                                Middle East and Europe 
Iraq                                Middle East and Europe 
Israel                              Middle East and Europe 
Jordan                              Middle East and Europe 
Kuwait                              Middle East and Europe 
Lebanon                             Middle East and Europe 
Libya                               Middle East and Europe 
Malta                               Middle East and Europe 
Oman                                Middle East and Europe 
Qatar                               Middle East and Europe 
Saudi Arabia                        Middle East and Europe 
Syria                               Middle East and Europe 
Turkey                              Middle East and Europe 
United Arab Emirates                Middle East and Europe 
Yemen                               Middle East and Europe 
Canada                              North America 
United States                       North America 
Australia                           South-East Asia 
Hong Kong S.A.R.                    South-East Asia 
Japan                               South-East Asia 
Korea, South                        South-East Asia 
New Zealand                         South-East Asia 
Singapore                           South-East Asia 
Taiwan                              South-East Asia 
Antigua and Barbuda                 Western Hemisphere 
Argentina                           Western Hemisphere 
Bahamas, The                        Western Hemisphere 
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Barbados                            Western Hemisphere 
Belize                              Western Hemisphere 
Bolivia                             Western Hemisphere 
Brazil                              Western Hemisphere 
Chile                               Western Hemisphere 
Colombia                            Western Hemisphere 
Costa Rica                          Western Hemisphere 
Dominica                            Western Hemisphere 
Dominican Republic                  Western Hemisphere 
Ecuador                             Western Hemisphere 
El Salvador                         Western Hemisphere 
Grenada                             Western Hemisphere 
Guatemala                           Western Hemisphere 
Guyana                              Western Hemisphere 
Haiti                               Western Hemisphere 
Honduras                            Western Hemisphere 
Jamaica                             Western Hemisphere 
Mexico                              Western Hemisphere 
Netherlands Antilles                Western Hemisphere 
Nicaragua                           Western Hemisphere 
Panama                              Western Hemisphere 
Paraguay                            Western Hemisphere 
Peru                                Western Hemisphere 
Saint Kitts and Nevis               Western Hemisphere 
Saint Lucia                         Western Hemisphere 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines    Western Hemisphere 
Suriname                            Western Hemisphere 
Trinidad and Tobago                 Western Hemisphere 
Uruguay                             Western Hemisphere 
Venezuela                           Western Hemisphere 
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9 Addenda 
It is not only necessary to look for new explanations and new analytical frameworks but to 
reconsider the whole range of past alternative theories which have been swept aside as 
outmoded, but which actually furnish better, if partial, explanations for what we actually 
observe.  
Dependency theory, World System Theory, Marx’s accounts of crisis, Hobson and Lenin’s 
analyses of classical imperialism, etc. 
Among these, of course, globalisation theory itself has a place; like any of them, elements of it 
explain elements of what we see in the world. What cannot be sustained is any hegemonic 
claim that globalisation theory is either adequate as it stands, capable of integrated 
development into an adequate theory, or superior to the theories which it has displaced. 
Not to say any such theory is perfect or adequate. Dependency theory faced a number of 
theoretical difficulties that its proponents were happy to acknowledge were nevere adequately 
resolved. There is a heated debate to say the least about Marx’s theory of the falling profit rate 
and as things stands, even the Marxists deny its validity (see eg Brenner) 
But if we face a choice between a body of theory which, no matter how analytically coherent, 
unfortunately fails to explain the basic facts, and another group of theories that do offer an 
account of the most basic trends we can actually observe, the scientific choice seems clear to 
me; to make progress we have first to return to the abandoned theories that do in fact explain 
the facts, and ask ourselves how and why they achieve it, and whether their explanations and 
concepts can form an element of a new, and superior theory. 
 
 
 
From this point of view, the function of the last two decades has been, in essence, to channel 
the world’s savings into the USA in order to reconstitute its economy, in the belief that the US 
can then return to functioning as the motor and leader of world growth, as it did during the 
fifties and perhaps to a lesser extent in the twenties. 
The problem is that all the evidence so far is against either another phase of Kondratieff 
expansion, or against a reconstitution of US productive superiority. The USA is so far embarked 
on a gamble that has failed. There are moreover good reasons to view the idea sceptically; 
during the Belle Epoque, Britain was the world leader but this period was dominated precisely 
by Britain’s long-term historical decline, and indeed, the precondition for the stable expansion 
of the 1950s was the replacement of British by US capital at the helm of the world economy, 
from a certain standpoint the economic outcome of the two World Wars. There was good 
reason for this, analysed extensively by writers such as Hobson: by placing all its resources into 
extending the world market, by concentrating on the export of capital and on maintaining 
military and financial superiority, Britain starved its own industries of investment.  
This is confirmed by what happened following World War II; Japan and Germany, the military 
losers in the war, had no empire into which to expand and instead evolved an intensive mode 
of accumulation, concentrating their investment on their own domestic economies for the 
simple reason that all the remaining investment opportunities had been denied them. The 
period of unquestioned US hegemony was therefore accompanied by the economic erosio of 
the very basis of this hegemony as Germany and Japan steadily caught up. 
 
